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ble sleeping position (A.].F. Webster,
JOB Symposium, November, 1981).

What About Grain-Fed Veal?
Most of the studies described
above have been concerned with the
productivity and welfare of milk-fed
veal. However, given the fact that the
majority of consumers (at least in the
U.S. and U.K.) find nothing objectionable
in a pink tinge to their veal meat, other
aspects of husbandry can probably be
varied as well.
For example, one New York state
farmer, Michael 5. Mosner, is already
profitably raising calves on grain in indoor and outdoor pens. Baby calves
(Hereford, Angus, and Charlois breeds)
are placed in the pens (12 by 32 ft) after
weaning at 5 weeks of age and remain
there for about 4 months, until slaughter. They are provided with a grain formula made up of corn, a protein supplement, and vitamins and iron, as well as
fresh straw for bedding. Milk replacer is
used only for baby calves, until they
reach 5 weeks of age. The animals are
generally healthier, because they are far
less likely to develop anemia than milkfed calves not given iron-containing straw.
The system also appears to be substantially less stressful for the animals.
The meat that results from this system is a pale pink which, according to
Mosner, has been found to be perfectly
acceptable in butcher shops and in the
chain stores. And because production
costs are substantially lower, the meat
can sell for far less than the milk-replacer
veal.

Conclusions
It is obvious that much of the research detailed here is still in a preliminary stage. We simply do not yet have
sufficient data to compare all of the elements involved in designing animal production systems that will ensure a fair
profit for farmers and at the same time
guarantee a minimum standard of wellbeing for the animals. Even the most
basic questions remain largely unexplored: Do we need more technology, or
less? Do legal regulations assist in guaranteeing welfare considerations, or
merely stifle private innovation? How
does the general public really feel about
paying more to ensure that meat animals
are raised as humanely as possible? There
are also some specific areas of study
that are vitally necessary for determining
how best to rear veal calves, for example:
• Does milk-fed veal really taste better? Can most people distinguish it from
grain- or grass-fed veal?
• What is the precise relationship
among genetic factors, lack of roughage
in the diet, and the redness of the meat?
• How can group housing conditions
be improved? Can the automatic nipple
feeders that distribute milk-replacer be
improved?
Until we have at least tentative answers for these kinds of questions, the
controversy about how best to raise veal
calves will inevitably continue.

Dana H. Murphy

TABLE 1. Calf Mortality Rates in Loose-Housed and Crated Veal,
Beef Calves, and the National Herd

Farm
Quantock Veal
Quantock Veal
Wysing Grange
Irish Veal Farms
British figures

Method
Crates
Loose-housed
Loose-housed
Loose-housed
All systems

Period
2/79-8/80
9/80-2/81
3/78-2/81
1980
1963

Total
calves
purchased
4,000
2,090
4,500
3,351
National

Total
deaths
259
105
169
97
herd

Percentage
6.46
5.10
3.75
2.89
5.3

P.J. Paxman, Volac Ltd.
Minutes of Evidence,
March, 1981.
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Genetic Adaptation in Relation to
Animal Welfare
R.G. Beilharz
Introduction
In this essay I outline the processes
of adaptation of animals and of animal
populations and discuss their relevance
to the problem of animal welfare. Because
"animal welfare" has many different
aspects including philosophical, ethical,
and biological, it is important to examine
some of the fundamental issues that underly the concept. Hence, in this essay, I
comment on how people come to "know,"
how information accumulates, and how
what we know influences our actions. I
also discuss the biological information
that is relevant to animal welfare. It is
my hope that, when this topic has been
placed within a broader framework of
this sort, more generally useful solutions
to the "animal welfare problem" may be
found.

What Is Adaptation?
The theory of evolution has become the unifying explanation underlying the whole of biology. Dobzhansky et
a/. (1977) summarize the concept of evolution by natural selection as follows:
"Among alternative genetic variants,
some result in features that are useful to
their carriers as adaptations to the environment. Individuals possessing useful
adaptations are likely to leave, on the
average, greater numbers of progeny
than individuals lacking them (or having
less useful adaptations). Therefore use-

ful adaptations become established in
populations .... Adaptations can be recognized in individuals- whether physiological, morphological, behavioral- as
well as [at] the level of the population."
At the level of the population, such
adaptation is the result of changing gene
frequencies. At the level of the individual, adaptation is the adjustment of the
individual to its environment, within the
scope of the developmental possibilities
allowed by its genetic blueprint.
Organisms are complex, and genes
interact with many other genes as well
as the environment in the process of
guiding the development of an organism.
While the science of quantitative genetics recognizes interactions in its explanatory model, the model is usually
expressed in terms of variation of the
trait at a particular point in the life cycle, e.g., the weight at 9 weeks, or "production" at maturity. I suggest that this
focus on a point in the life cycle has not
allowed the full explanatory potential of
quantitative genetics to be realized.
One aspect of variation, including
genetic variation, in growth and development concerns the degree of flexibility
of the developmental path. Rendel's
(1967) elaboration of Waddington's concept of canalization of development discusses this aspect in detail. In a consideration of behavioral traits, the ideas
of "instinctive" behavior (that is, behavior that is programmed via genetically
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determined neural pathways) and learned
behavior (behavior shaped separately in
each individual by its particular experience during development) are pertinent
to the concept of flexibility of development.
The important point to make is
that, in evolution, the genes providing
those ontogenetic pathways that are
most appropriate for the particular environment will be selected. Thus, constant
environments, or recurring stimuli that
always require a constant response, will
favor selection for an invariable response
(which has often been termed instinctive
behavior). In contrast, variable, unpredictable environments will favor selection for a flexible path of development,
in which individual learning becomes
important. Different degrees of variability of the environment will select for different amounts of learning, and the things
that are readily learned will be found to
be the responses to particular, important stimuli. The amount of variation
among these responses is important for
the survival of members of the species.

others, and as McBride (1980) suggested,
genetic adaptation will still occur at the
population level.
We can summarize the process of
genetic adaptation by endorsing McBride's
model. In any defined environment, selection of appropriate developmental
paths will occur, usually accompanied
by a genetic response. This process is inevitable and will proceed to the point
where the majority of individuals cope
adequately with the environment.
In particular, domestication has
been a special type of evolutionary process that has resulted in the adaptation
of animals to environments specified by
man. As man intensifies the conditions
under which animals are kept, further selection is taking place. We must now
consider how adaptation is relevant to
animal welfare.

How Is Adaptation Relevant to
Welfare?

"Problems" in animal welfare derive
at least in part from the fact that animal
welfare has been approached from the
When development is seen in this points of view of many very different beway, it is clear that when animals are put lief systems. A traditional Christian beinto a new environment, individuals of lief has been that man, made in the imsome populations and species will be age of God, has control over all the rest
able to adapt their behavior phenotypi- of creation. A radically different belief,
cally by learning. Other species will not common among Hindus and Buddhists, is
be able to cope and will show stress. that animals and man are fellow creatMcBride's (1980) model illustrates this ures, thereby implying no rights of man
phenomenon well. Where individuals do. over animals. Singer (1975) argues as a
not have the capacity to adjust pheno- philosopher and supplies the intellectual
typically, adaptation of the population underpinning for Australia's animal welwill require a rapid genetic response to fare movement, which sets out to deprevent the dying out of the population. fend the rights of animals against exSuch a process of adaptation is likely to ploitation by man. Ethologists approach
be accompanied by much "suffering." By animal welfare from the point of view of
contrast, where phenotypic adjustment a natural science (e.g., Beilharz and
is possible, each individual can adapt Zeeb, 1981). I strongly believe that the
and there may be little "suffering." To differing backgrounds of the persons
the extent that some individuals do suf- who argue for and against animal welfer, this implies that some are not able to fare are the underlying cause of many of
handle the new environment as well as the "problems" of animal welfare. Is it
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possible to find a common ground? To
try to do so, we must first ask some very
basic questions.

.

Why, and What, Do People "Know"?
One process by which humans accumulate knowledge (albeit limited)
about reality occurs via the so-called
scientific method. The scientific method
consists of (1) formulation of models
such as axioms, theories, and hypotheses, and (2) testing of these models
against reality by means of experiments
or other forms of objective observation
and measurement. If observation discloses a discrepancy between the model
and our preconceived reality, the model
is altered. This procedure represents an
advance, because an error has been eliminated. However, one can never prove
that the model is true. One can only
change those parts of it that appear to
be wrong and hope that the changed model is a better representation of reality.
Man's everyday knowledge is adjusted to reality in a similar way, although
no deliberate effort is made at objective
testing of explanatory models. There
are, however, areas of "knowledge" or
"belief" in which objective testing
seems impossible. These areas, e.g., the
existence of an after! ife or the existence
of God, are said by many to be outside
the realm of science because there
seems to be no objective way to discriminate among the different explanatory
models. But people still have explanatory models in these areas, which are termed "belief" or "faith" and which vary
widely.
In this discussion, I am not making
any value judgments about the scientific
method, on the one hand, and religious
belief on the other. I am simply pointing
out why, when tests against reality are
easily available, most people will believe
the same "facts." But this same unanimity is not to be expected in those fields of
knowledge where tests against reality
/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982
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are not readily available. In such areas a
tolerant examination of many different
explanatory models (beliefs) seems to be
the most reasonable thing to do.
We may take the models underlying
Singer's (1975) philosophy as examples. I
can summarize and comment on this
philosophy as follows:
1. Singer recognizes that there is a
widespread prejudice, which he calls
"speciesism," that causes humans to
favor the interests of humans over those
of animals.
2. Singer states that, by analogy
with racism and sexism, this prejudice of
speciesism is unjustified. He asserts we
should reject all such prejudices and
adopt the principle of equal consideration of (varying) interests. He derives
from this the idea that humans have no
right to utilize animals for their own
ends. I comment that this is an example
of a postulate (an explanatory model
and its consequences) that Singer is
making here. Other postulates are also
possible, e.g., that, because people have
the capacity for "imaginative anticipation" and we assume animals do not, we
should consider people's rights above
those of animals.
3. Singer continues his argument
with the assertion that cruelty, pain, and
suffering should be eliminated whenever possible. This is another postulate,
but one which I and most people will
wish to accept. For me the interesting
question is, How do we know when animals are suffering or in pain?
4. Singer recognizes that killing of
animals is a different problem from that
of causing them pain. I comment that if,
as suggested in item 2, the principle of
equality, or rejection of speciesism, is
not the only possible starting point, a
conclusion different from the one that
humans may not kill and utilize animals
may legitimately follow, even though we
may agree completely with Singer about
119
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possible to find a common ground? To
try to do so, we must first ask some very
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Why, and What, Do People "Know"?
One process by which humans accumulate knowledge (albeit limited)
about reality occurs via the so-called
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against reality by means of experiments
or other forms of objective observation
and measurement. If observation discloses a discrepancy between the model
and our preconceived reality, the model
is altered. This procedure represents an
advance, because an error has been eliminated. However, one can never prove
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of God, are said by many to be outside
the realm of science because there
seems to be no objective way to discriminate among the different explanatory
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widely.
In this discussion, I am not making
any value judgments about the scientific
method, on the one hand, and religious
belief on the other. I am simply pointing
out why, when tests against reality are
easily available, most people will believe
the same "facts." But this same unanimity is not to be expected in those fields of
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elimination of cruelty (as summarized in
item 3).
Postulates such as Singer's principle of equality are models of how we
should behave and seem to reside in the
realm of belief, outside the realm of
science. Many other postulates can be
devised that seem equally plausible in
the absence of any objective check
against reality. In fact, people often
make "moral" judgments based on untestable "religious" convictions. Here
again, I make no value judgments. I
have simply tried to describe the problem facing us. The next section attempts
to find the answer.

sphere.
It seems rational to recognize this
state of affairs. It must also be accepted
that, concerning the question of "animal
welfare," a knowledge of evolution and
how animals adapt to their environment
is also very relevant.

What Is Reality, Relevant to
Living Things?

All forms of life survive and develop
by utilizing other forms of life, such as
food or prey species, predators, parasites,
and symbionts. A recent trend in evolutionary thinking (e.g., R. Dawkins, 1976)
has focused our attention on the fact
that the ruthless exploitation of other
life forms may well take place at the
How Do People judge Whether a
level of the individual, or even at the
Particular Model Is "Good" or "Right"?
I believe that there is no ultimate level of the gene, rather than at the level
external standard to help us answer this of the species. For us, it is important to
question. Each individual will have his note that utilization of other life forms
own model of the "ultimate" truth, and has been the natural commonplace
"purpose," for his life. I thus accept the throughout the development of life on
fact that there will always be varying earth. Again, without making any value
views among people about a problem judgments, we can accept this as a neusuch as animal welfare. However, varying tral fact about the real world around us.
It follows that humans are in no
views of its members will not prevent a
society as a whole from taking action. In way odd in utilizing other forms of life
practice, it is usually political action for their own good. In fact, if we could
that shapes what a society does and that free ourselves of our human prejudices
governs the selection of postulates a so- and take a broad perspective, we would
ciety uses as its guidelines for behavior. find that in evolution, the interaction of
Duncan (1980) has recognized clearly domestic animals with humans has been
that "decisions on the degree to which, a very successful form of symbiosis, beand the manner in which, we [humans] cause neither humans nor domestic aniexploit animals are ethical decisions mals would be present in the same huge
which should be made by society in gen- numbers without the other (Elton, 1958;
eral but only when they have a knowl- Zeuner, 1963). To me it makes no sense
edge of facts." In the animal welfare to talk about "rights" of domestic anidebate in West Germany, Wickler (1980) mals, other than in this specific context
argues that humans cannot know what of their symbiosis with humans. If huthe real interests of animals are and that mans had not been present, there would
what enacted legislation actually ends be no domestic animals about whose
up protecting is (some) people's interests rights we could argue. Please note that I
in animals, not the interests of the ani- am not, here, claiming that we have a
mal itself. This statement, like Duncan's, right to misuse domestic animals. I simclearly places the animal welfare ques- ply maintain that it is not in accord with
tion within the political or ethical reality to even imagine, far less to give
120
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rights to, domestic animals under any
circumstances other than in their association with humans.
Thus, that part of Singer's postulate
which deals with humans' utilization of
other animals is not in accord with the
reality of life as it has developed on
earth. Man is speciesist, and so is every
other species. If humans were to act on
Singer's postulate of equality, they
would be imposing on themselves a new
restriction for which there is no justification anywhere in the real world. Clearly,
humans are omnivores adapted to eating meat, as well as many other foods.
Their pet dogs and cats are carnivores.
Some animal welfare literature has suggested that even these pets should be
fed without meat. This would of course
be completely counter to evolutionary
adaptations. As will become clear below, I agree that we can go against particular evolutionary trends and adapt
ourselves, as well as our cats and dogs,
to eating vegetable matter only, although
there has been some disquiet expressed
recently in the medical literature about
the effects of vegetarian diets on the development of small children (Anonymous,
1978; Shu II eta/., 1977; Tripp eta/., 1979).
But such a step is completely unnecessary; I do not think that there is a compelling reason of any sort to suggest that we
should not utilize animals or eat their
flesh.

What Is Cruelty?
While we can all agree that cruelty,
pain, and suffering should be avoided
whenever possible, there may be many
situations where there will be doubt
about whether cruelty exists.
How can we judge whether an animal in a confined space is suffering?
Beilharz and Zeeb (1981) have shown that
it is very difficult to demonstrate that
apparently healthy animals are suffering,
even when kept in small confined spaces.
Explanatory models of instinctive behav/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982
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ior (e.g., Lorenz, 1978; Manning, 1979)
vary, and they do not allow one to argue,
on the basis of variations in frequencies
of behavior observed under different
conditions, that behavioral frustration in
any environment necessarily leads to
suffering. Similarly, offering animals a
choice between environments gives inconclusive results. With appropriate rearing and prior experience almost any
familiar environment will be preferred
over other environments (M. Dawkins,
1976). Wickler (1980) suggested that the
best indicators of variation in welfare
are symptoms of stress (physiologically
defined), together with observable searching movements or goal-directed striving
in particular situations. Such symptoms,
as well as manifest injuries, indicate that
the animals are not adapted to their situation. McBride's (1980) model is also
relevant, suggesting that animals showing the exhaustion phase of the General
Adaptation Syndrome, i.e., severe physiological strain, failure to reproduce, and
death, are clearly suffering in their environment.
What can we say about free-ranging
domestic animals, or wild animals in
their natural habitat? In discussing this
issue, I find it useful to consider an extreme environment such as a desert. Although humans and most other mammals
and birds suffer stress, often to the point
of death, in the central area of Australia,
there are mammals such as the mulgara
(Dasycercus cristicaudata) (Ride, 1970)
that are found only in this region. The
mulgara has physiological adaptations
that allow it to exist without drinking
water (it gets it from the meat it eats)
and kidneys which are so efficient that it
can excrete the large. amount of urea
produced as a by-product of its diet in a
highly concentrated form. As one of its
behavioral adaptations, it avoids heat
by remaining underground during the
day. Presumably such species enjoy an
121

Comment

R.G. Beilharz

elimination of cruelty (as summarized in
item 3).
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vary, and they do not allow one to argue,
on the basis of variations in frequencies
of behavior observed under different
conditions, that behavioral frustration in
any environment necessarily leads to
suffering. Similarly, offering animals a
choice between environments gives inconclusive results. With appropriate rearing and prior experience almost any
familiar environment will be preferred
over other environments (M. Dawkins,
1976). Wickler (1980) suggested that the
best indicators of variation in welfare
are symptoms of stress (physiologically
defined), together with observable searching movements or goal-directed striving
in particular situations. Such symptoms,
as well as manifest injuries, indicate that
the animals are not adapted to their situation. McBride's (1980) model is also
relevant, suggesting that animals showing the exhaustion phase of the General
Adaptation Syndrome, i.e., severe physiological strain, failure to reproduce, and
death, are clearly suffering in their environment.
What can we say about free-ranging
domestic animals, or wild animals in
their natural habitat? In discussing this
issue, I find it useful to consider an extreme environment such as a desert. Although humans and most other mammals
and birds suffer stress, often to the point
of death, in the central area of Australia,
there are mammals such as the mulgara
(Dasycercus cristicaudata) (Ride, 1970)
that are found only in this region. The
mulgara has physiological adaptations
that allow it to exist without drinking
water (it gets it from the meat it eats)
and kidneys which are so efficient that it
can excrete the large. amount of urea
produced as a by-product of its diet in a
highly concentrated form. As one of its
behavioral adaptations, it avoids heat
by remaining underground during the
day. Presumably such species enjoy an
121

R. G. Beilharz

advantage gained from the reduced competition found in such a difficult environment. But are they suffering? I believe
that we can do no better than to assume

that the welfare of any adapted form of
life is guaranteed, i.e., that it does not
"suffer" in its particular environment.
Domestication is an evolutionary
process in which plants and animals continually adapt their genotypes to the
environment and the demands created
by man. As a result, domestic animals
are now very different from their wild
ancestor species. And there is no evidence to suggest that domestic animals
have lost the power to adapt further. We
must therefore expect further changes,
including some that will help our animals
adjust to intensive conditions, such as
cages for hens. From the welfare point
of view, the important adaptive changes
are those related to the performance of
ins~inctive behavior, which is mainly under genetic control. While morphological
structures evolve relatively slowly, the
levels of motivation and the threshold
values of releasing stimuli are continually adjusted during evolution, so that behavior is appropriate to the environment
(Mayr, 1963). The resulting changes in
frequency of appearance of behaviors
are important in the adaptation of animals during domestication.
Stress symptoms, inappropriate behavior, resulting injury, and lowered "production," particularly as these relate to
survival and reproduction, must be expected when animals are first placed in
environments to which they are not adapted. A period of adaptation, as discussed
earlier, follows unless we prevent it. The
necessary genetic shifts of either motivation strengths, or threshold levels, or
both together, will occur. The result is a
new strain of domestic animal that is adjusted to the new condition. For such an
adjusted animal we should be able to

make the assumption that welfare is guar-
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anteed, just as we must make the same
assumption about any wild animal in its
natural habitat.
It follows that keeping animals in
confined spaces is cruel only if inappropriate animals are kept in the confined
spaces. After such animals have been allowed to adapt, then the cause of the
cruelty has disappeared. It would, how-

ever, be cruel to continually alter environments such that animals were not
able to keep pace through adaptation.
Tschanz (1978) wrote a very perceptive paper about behavioral norms and
adaptation of animals to confined environments. He stated that the best measure of adaptation to an environment is
reproduction, considered in its broadest
sense, i.e., the ability of animals to maintain population numbers in that environment. We can all intuitively agree to this
precept, and we applaud zookeepers
who continue to alter the environments
of their animals until they succeed in
getting them to breed. In natural evolution as well, the measure of success is
reproduction, considered in this broad
sense. There is no doubt that, on the
basis of this criterion, there are poultry
and pigs that are already quite well
adapted to intensive farming.

What Ethical Consequences Follow. From
Our Discussion?
It is impossible for humans to leave
evolution to proceed by itself, i.e., completely free of their influence. Thus,
there seems only one correct ethical decision: to direct the further evolution of
life toward "the good" of the creation,
i.e., of all of life. What this "good" is will
have to be determined, and all men of
goodwill should contribute to this definition of the ideal. I do not claim that
science is our only tool in this task. Presumably all modes of human knowledge
can contribute. My personal belief is
that the use of reason will be a very important element in this effort.

Whatever we may decide, it is clear
that the relationship between humans
and their domestic animals is merely a
part of this reassessment of the totality
of our relationships. In this limited area
our task will be to define the environment in which our animals are to be
kept. All relevant aspects, including economic efficiency, the health of animals,
products, and keepers, and working conditions, should be considered. Then we
should deliberately adapt our animals to
the defined conditions through breeding.
This procedure may have to be approached in stages if the environmental conditions aimed at are radically different
from those to which the animals are now
adapted. The evolutionary processes, if
they are not obstructed or misdirected,
must lead to such a degree of adaptation that welfare will have to be taken
for granted, just as we can do no better
than to take for granted the welfare of
any wild animal in its natural habitat.
Many people have recognized that
the correct design of the environment to
fit an animal's current needs is a powerful method for improving animal welfare. I agree that environmental modification is usually a quicker and more
practical solution to a "welfare problem" than is genetic adaptation. We
must guard, however, against assuming
that the behavioral needs of animals, as
they now exist, should be taken as inviolable. The needs of present domestic
animals are different from those of their
ancestors- they also differ among
breeds- and there is no evidence that
they have stopped changing in response
to environmental changes. It seems rational to use genetic change, as well as
environmental change, in our solution to
"welfare problems."
The undoubted stress entailed in an
adaptation period to a defined set of
conditions may be justified as morally
appropriate, provided that it is done in
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the light of the long-term rational plans
we have made for the good of our domestic animals. Continual further adaptation of animals to ever-decreasing
spaces, which might follow from simple
considerations of economic gain, must,
however, be recognized as cruel. This is
a case where minimum standards of environment, rationally agreed upon by
people of goodwill, after consideration
of all relevant information, should be respected and enforced- where necessary,
through legislation.

Final Considerations
Well-meaning defenders of the rights
of animals (e.g., Teutsch, 1981) have argued against the morality of deliberate
genetic adaptation as out I ined by Zeeb
and Beilharz (1980; see also Beilharz and
Zeeb, 1981 ). I am convinced that such
opposition arises from the different
assumptions of Teutsch on the one hand
and Zeeb and Beilharz on the other. I
have deliberately taken a very broad
perspective in the present article and
have tried to show that genetic adaptation of domestic animals can only be a
small part of mankind's overall guidance
of future evolution. People of goodwill
must assume moral responsibility for the
future evolution of life on earth, for the
good of all of life as well as for mankind.
But, with Duncan (1980), let us determine to make our ethical decisions based
on facts. Since it is life itself that we are
considering, a thorough understanding
of the facts of biology and its unifying
theme of evolution are essential.
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advantage gained from the reduced competition found in such a difficult environment. But are they suffering? I believe
that we can do no better than to assume

that the welfare of any adapted form of
life is guaranteed, i.e., that it does not
"suffer" in its particular environment.
Domestication is an evolutionary
process in which plants and animals continually adapt their genotypes to the
environment and the demands created
by man. As a result, domestic animals
are now very different from their wild
ancestor species. And there is no evidence to suggest that domestic animals
have lost the power to adapt further. We
must therefore expect further changes,
including some that will help our animals
adjust to intensive conditions, such as
cages for hens. From the welfare point
of view, the important adaptive changes
are those related to the performance of
ins~inctive behavior, which is mainly under genetic control. While morphological
structures evolve relatively slowly, the
levels of motivation and the threshold
values of releasing stimuli are continually adjusted during evolution, so that behavior is appropriate to the environment
(Mayr, 1963). The resulting changes in
frequency of appearance of behaviors
are important in the adaptation of animals during domestication.
Stress symptoms, inappropriate behavior, resulting injury, and lowered "production," particularly as these relate to
survival and reproduction, must be expected when animals are first placed in
environments to which they are not adapted. A period of adaptation, as discussed
earlier, follows unless we prevent it. The
necessary genetic shifts of either motivation strengths, or threshold levels, or
both together, will occur. The result is a
new strain of domestic animal that is adjusted to the new condition. For such an
adjusted animal we should be able to
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anteed, just as we must make the same
assumption about any wild animal in its
natural habitat.
It follows that keeping animals in
confined spaces is cruel only if inappropriate animals are kept in the confined
spaces. After such animals have been allowed to adapt, then the cause of the
cruelty has disappeared. It would, how-

ever, be cruel to continually alter environments such that animals were not
able to keep pace through adaptation.
Tschanz (1978) wrote a very perceptive paper about behavioral norms and
adaptation of animals to confined environments. He stated that the best measure of adaptation to an environment is
reproduction, considered in its broadest
sense, i.e., the ability of animals to maintain population numbers in that environment. We can all intuitively agree to this
precept, and we applaud zookeepers
who continue to alter the environments
of their animals until they succeed in
getting them to breed. In natural evolution as well, the measure of success is
reproduction, considered in this broad
sense. There is no doubt that, on the
basis of this criterion, there are poultry
and pigs that are already quite well
adapted to intensive farming.

What Ethical Consequences Follow. From
Our Discussion?
It is impossible for humans to leave
evolution to proceed by itself, i.e., completely free of their influence. Thus,
there seems only one correct ethical decision: to direct the further evolution of
life toward "the good" of the creation,
i.e., of all of life. What this "good" is will
have to be determined, and all men of
goodwill should contribute to this definition of the ideal. I do not claim that
science is our only tool in this task. Presumably all modes of human knowledge
can contribute. My personal belief is
that the use of reason will be a very important element in this effort.

Whatever we may decide, it is clear
that the relationship between humans
and their domestic animals is merely a
part of this reassessment of the totality
of our relationships. In this limited area
our task will be to define the environment in which our animals are to be
kept. All relevant aspects, including economic efficiency, the health of animals,
products, and keepers, and working conditions, should be considered. Then we
should deliberately adapt our animals to
the defined conditions through breeding.
This procedure may have to be approached in stages if the environmental conditions aimed at are radically different
from those to which the animals are now
adapted. The evolutionary processes, if
they are not obstructed or misdirected,
must lead to such a degree of adaptation that welfare will have to be taken
for granted, just as we can do no better
than to take for granted the welfare of
any wild animal in its natural habitat.
Many people have recognized that
the correct design of the environment to
fit an animal's current needs is a powerful method for improving animal welfare. I agree that environmental modification is usually a quicker and more
practical solution to a "welfare problem" than is genetic adaptation. We
must guard, however, against assuming
that the behavioral needs of animals, as
they now exist, should be taken as inviolable. The needs of present domestic
animals are different from those of their
ancestors- they also differ among
breeds- and there is no evidence that
they have stopped changing in response
to environmental changes. It seems rational to use genetic change, as well as
environmental change, in our solution to
"welfare problems."
The undoubted stress entailed in an
adaptation period to a defined set of
conditions may be justified as morally
appropriate, provided that it is done in
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the light of the long-term rational plans
we have made for the good of our domestic animals. Continual further adaptation of animals to ever-decreasing
spaces, which might follow from simple
considerations of economic gain, must,
however, be recognized as cruel. This is
a case where minimum standards of environment, rationally agreed upon by
people of goodwill, after consideration
of all relevant information, should be respected and enforced- where necessary,
through legislation.

Final Considerations
Well-meaning defenders of the rights
of animals (e.g., Teutsch, 1981) have argued against the morality of deliberate
genetic adaptation as out I ined by Zeeb
and Beilharz (1980; see also Beilharz and
Zeeb, 1981 ). I am convinced that such
opposition arises from the different
assumptions of Teutsch on the one hand
and Zeeb and Beilharz on the other. I
have deliberately taken a very broad
perspective in the present article and
have tried to show that genetic adaptation of domestic animals can only be a
small part of mankind's overall guidance
of future evolution. People of goodwill
must assume moral responsibility for the
future evolution of life on earth, for the
good of all of life as well as for mankind.
But, with Duncan (1980), let us determine to make our ethical decisions based
on facts. Since it is life itself that we are
considering, a thorough understanding
of the facts of biology and its unifying
theme of evolution are essential.
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Updating the British
Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876:
Can the Center Hold?
Judith Hampson
Long experience with unsuccessful
attempts by British animal welfare groups
to promote private members' bills for reform or rep I a cement of the 1876 Cruelty
to Animals Act (Viet. C. 77, 1876) has
convinced reformists that achieving this
kind of change by lobbying Parliament
may be impossible. It was for this reason
that a small reformist group- spearheaded by the ex-chairman of the Labour Party, Lord Houghton, and an eminent surgeon, the late Lord Platt- was formed
and drafted reform proposals in a document widely known as the Houghton/Piatt
Memorandum (paper submitted to the
Home Secretary, 1976). This report called
for a substantial tightening up of controls already established under the 1876
Act. All of these modifications, the report noted, could have been effected by
administrative action alone.
Subsequent to the co-operative effort made by animal welfare societies
during Animal Welfare Year (1976) (see
Hollands, 1981), five joint consultative
bodies were established to coordinate
the activities of animal welfare societies
in regard to their major areas of concern.
One of these, the Committee for Reform
of Animal Experimentation (CRAE) was
set up to work specifically for reform of
the 1876 Act. This committee, which incorporated the earlier Houghton/Piatt
Croup, is made up of politicians, scientists, and spokespersons from animal welfare societies who serve on it as individual citizens, not as representative of their
respective societies. This policy leaves
the Committee free to engage in political lobbying.

Since 1975 the animal welfare reform movement has steadily been gaining impetus. Events that were important
in this increase in awareness included
the puhlic outcry raised in response to
exposure of ICI's "smoking beagles" in
the British Sunday press, the militant activities of the newly formed "Animal Liberation Front," and the publicity focused
on the subject of animal rights after the
publication of Richard Ryder's popular
book, Victims of Science (1976).
Largely because of this public
pressure, the more moderate reformist
group, CRAE, was able to abandon its efforts to achieve reform through Parliament and, instead, exerted pressure via
the "back door": deliberations were initiated with the senior Home Office officials who administer the 1876 Act. In 1977,
CRAE members met with the then Home
Secretary, Merlyn Rees, and agreed upon
a number of reforms that could easily be
effected administratively.
This, the first meeting of its kind
since World War II, was a historic event
in the reform movement. No Home Secretary would ever have agreed to meet
with representatives of any single society, since this would have opened the
door to an endless series of such meetings. But he was willing to meet with a
joint consultative body that was seeking
moderate and practicable reforms. Since
that time, CRAE has held regular meetings with senior Home Office officials
and has worked to achieve a productive
dialogue.
But by the late 1970's, it was becoming clear that the reformist campaign
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